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Abstract. In this paper, we argue that mating games, a concept that denotes cultural practices
characterized by a competitive element and an ornamental character, are essential drivers behind
the emergence and maintenance of human cultural practices. In order to substantiate this claim, we
sketch out the essential role of the game’s players and audience, as well as the ways in which games
can mature and turn into relatively stable cultural practices. After outlining the life phase of mating
games – their emergence, rise, maturation, and possible eventual decline – we go on to argue that
participation in these games (in each phase) does make sense from an adaptationist point of view.
The strong version of our theory which proposes that all cultural practices are, or once were,
mating games, allows us to derive a set of testable predictions for the ﬁelds of archaeology,
economics, and psychology.
Introduction
Only a theory that can encompass cultural evolution, biological evolution, and
the interplay between both can genuinely be called a gene-culture co-evolu-
tionary theory (Feldman and Laland 1996; Smith 2000). This paper attempts to
provide a building block for such a ‘grand unifying theory of human culture’
by exploring, and elaborating upon, the idea that a substantial part of human
culture can be interpreted and studied as ‘mating games,’ viz. as forms of intra-
and intersexual competition between individuals of our species. Unpacking this
idea will show that the emergence, maturation, and possible eventual decline of
cultural practices does make sense from a Darwinian perspective. The first
section discusses the general relevance of games and sexual selection for the
genesis, evolution, and understanding of culture, outlining along the way a
number of working hypotheses. The second section discusses the essential roles
of players and audience, and elucidates how the specific factors that attract (a)
players and (b) audiences to these games can be placed within a Darwinian
framework. The third section looks at what role the innovation, change, and
stabilization of cultural practices has within our mating game theory. The last
section discusses two different versions of the theory. We conclude with a set of
testable predictions for the fields of archaeology, economics, and psychology,
derived from the mating game theory.
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It is noteworthy that when Darwin introduced the concept of sexual selection,
in ‘The Descent of Man,’ he immediately applied it to the evolution of human
culture. Apparently, Darwin saw cultural elements like clothing, music, and
dance as the result of selection operating on traits that enhance an individual’s
mating success (Darwin 1871). Geoffrey Miller, who has most recently taken
up this idea again, argues that each culture develops its own set of courtship
rituals (Miller 2000), and that these rituals help the individuals of a particular
culture either to show their fitness to potential mates or to evaluate the fitness
of potential mates. Miller speculates, for instance, that story-telling, poetry,
visual arts, sports, humour, and even philosophy are to be understood as
strategies to obtain and/or show status in our culture.
We shall limit ourselves for the time being to this subset of cultural practices,
which we call cultural mating games. In the conclusion, we will discuss the
relative size of this subset with respect to the entire set of cultural practices. But
now we should like to specify what we mean by mating games, and introduce
two working hypotheses based on two essential characteristics. The ﬁrst is that
many cultural practices have a competitive element. Participating and/or
excelling in cultural activities may impress members of the other sex (inter-
sexual selection) or it may help one to attain a higher position in the hierarchy
of one’s own sex (intrasexual selection). We are aware that distinguishing be-
tween two forms of sexual selection is a tricky issue: ‘‘Intersexual and intra-
sexual selection are conceptually related in that mate choice preferences exerted
by one sex should influence the resources over which intrasexual competition
occurs in the other sex.’’ (Buss 1988, 616). It is well-known that status and its
correlates (resources, longevity, good genes, etc.) increase an individual’s
attractiveness as a mate, and that the intimate entanglement of intrasexual and
intrasexual selection is very strong in our species due to Homo sapiens’p e r -
vasive tendency to ritualize agonistic behaviour (Eibl-Ebesfeldt 1979).
Now it is essential to stress that we understand the competitive element as
the result of, and not as the motive for, participating in the game. As a con-
sequence, not all mating games are openly competitive. Our first working
hypothesis, then, is that mating games produce a rank order because of their
inherent competitiveness.
It is important to note that the survival value of mating games is relatively
limited. More often than not, mating games lack clear utility: the importance of
mating games in quantitative terms, in terms of costs, that is, is overshadowed
by its ‘residual’ quality (Lancy 1980). The costs include, for example, the
opportunity costs: the costs accrued from lost fitness benefits that might have
been achieved by a savvier use of the resources. The time, energy, and financial
resources weightlifters spend on their training cannot be spent on other, more
useful activities. While the lack of utility would seem at first sight to rule out
many cultural practices as mating games – after all, tools and other aspects of
technological culture are clearly useful – we shall argue later on that these
476practices may also have evolved from mating games (see also Mithen 2003).
These possible exceptions aside, most cultural activities are purely ornamental,
as if this sort of culture transcended the immediate needs of life. Our second
working hypothesis, then, is that mating games are ornamental in nature, at
least at a certain stage in their development.
The ornamental character of mating games aligns our theory with costly
signaling theory (Zahavi 1975). Indeed, we claim (1) that the costs of partici-
pating in mating games provide accurate information about the player’s
qualities and (2) that engaging in cultural mating games is costly, at the very
least because of the opportunity costs. Our approach to cultural mating games
is informed by the description, in Maynard-Smith and Harper, of cost-added
signals (1995). Players signal a certain quality, even if the qualities signaled by
excelling at various games are probably quite different. With no pretensions at
being exhaustive, we suggest that the need to signal qualities that are predictive
of inclusive fitness – physical health (football), strength (weightlifting), intel-
ligence (chess), fertility (beauty contests), and vigor (running) – may have
spawned a variety of cultural mating games. Those qualities that may be
attractive to potential partners pursuing a more specific mating strategy, such
as loyalty (supporting a sports team), conscientiousness (collecting stamps),
and innovativeness (starting new cultural games), may have been at the origin
of a different set of games.
Examples of what we consider to be mating games are sports, intellectual
games, hobbies, certain professions, and also currents in literature, art, fashion;
even science and religion might be seen as mating games. There are many
diﬀerent ways of categorizing these games: some contests are overt, some
masked; there are games played by a population as a whole and there are niche
games; there are games of chance (poker, lottery, dicing), of skill (running,
chess, soccer), of simulation (role playing), of vertigo (bungee jumping,
mountaineering) – to mention just a few of the best-known categorizations
(see, e.g., Caillois 1961). Most categories encompass games in countless
numbers, a diversity suggestive of the fact that the great majority of cultural
games are not ‘hard-wired’ in our nervous system. Indeed, it is likely that
humans have some cultural adaptations, but these adaptations are flexible and
require major input from the social and cultural environment. To give just one
example, sexual selection may have designed a musical intelligence, but jazz,
minimalism, and pop are clearly modern creations and not the (direct) result of
biological selection pressures (Gardner 1985). In other words, the specific
content and rules of cultural games are usually invented, learned, or trans-
formed by more or less intelligent individuals. Such games are to a large extent
a matter of transmitted culture (Tooby and Cosmides 1992). Still, one can
expect fitness to be an influencing factor in (1) the preference players and
public show for a certain game, (2) the further development of already existing
games, and (3) the invention of new games. After all, one may assume that
many of these games are culturally invented indicators of bodily and psycho-
logical fitness (Miller 2000; Ohler and Nieding 2005).
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determined by the mating preferences of the opposite sex, and by the sample
tactics the opposite sex uses to gather information about prospective mates
(Widemo and Saether 1999). There are, however, some important differences
between courtship rituals in non-human animals and typically human cultural
mating games. Some of these differences, including the huge difference in
variety between humans and other species, can be attributed to the diversity of
mating preferences and sample tactics in humans. In the first place, human
mating strategies are highly conditional (Gangestad and Simpson 2000):
environmental conditions determine the adaptive value of mating preference
and sample tactic. As an example, pooled comparison (‘looking for the optimal
mate’) is preferable in stable and safe environments, whereas threshold-based
rules (‘looking for a good-enough mate’) tend to yield higher fitness in unsafe
environments (Gibson and Langen 1996). This seriously complicates the study
of human mating games given the fact that even in one society different
individuals occupy different environmental niches. Thirdly, in human societies,
prestige and hierarchical rank are correlated but not necessarily identical
(Freese and Cohen 1973; Henrich and Gil-White 2001). Fourthly, Homo
sapiens’ environment of evolutionary adaptedness (EEA) in some respects
differs dramatically from humans’ current environment, and this may lead to a
mismatch between our present conditions and our evolved mating preferences
and strategies. Fifthly, both sexes in our species are choosy (Buss and Schmitt
1993), which means that members of the both sexes must oscillate between
playing and observing. The fact that women also engage in game-playing
activities (mating games) is also noteworthy, because it reveals that the run-
away model of sexual selection – the so-called ‘sexy sons’-hypothesis – is less
likely to apply to human cultural activities than the ‘good genes’ model. After
all, runaway sexual selection applies primarily to male traits: a ‘sexy daughter’-
effect can only be very weak (Anderson 1994). Furthermore, pure runaway
selection usually promotes strong sexual dimorphism, and to the extent human
males and females both take part in cultural activities, such a model fits the
facts less well than a good genes model of sexual selection. Last but not least,
humans are particularly skilled at deception and manipulation (Trivers 1991;
Rue 1994), so that many of the signals sent by the cultural players might be
meant to manipulate prospective partners and/or rivals rather than to inform
them correctly. Indeed, even genuinely informative games require some form of
manipulation, since they have to attract players and audience. The next section
looks at this kind of seduction.
Everyone’s a winner
The winner of a mating game competition usually gains in status, and, on
average, enhancing one’s status is beneﬁcial for one’s reproductive success
(Cummins2005).Hence,sincebiologicalselectionhasbuiltourneuroendocrinal
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baffling from a Darwinian point of view why it is that many players enter into
competitions they are bound to lose. Considering that the cost of losing seems
huge, one would expect people (1) to avoid participation in games they cannot
play well enough to win, and (2) to be able to detect such games. The upshot is
that a Darwinian theory of mating games must be able to construct models
capable of explaining why someone would be interested in playing games he/she
cannot but lose.
It has to be acknowledged that it is not easy to predict the outcome of most
mating games, and this can lead to mistakes in two ways. The ﬁrst is that
players may overestimate their chances because they lack a realistic image of
the game, of their future rivals, or of their own skills. The point of note,
however, is that entering may seem a mistake when considered from the limited
perspective of one game only, but an intelligent choice when considered from
broader, long-term perspective: entering many games may lead to more success
than entering no game at all, even when the odds of every single game are
against the player. In other words, unfounded self-esteem can sometimes be
more adaptive than well-founded self-depreciation (Heckhausen and Gollwit-
zer 1987). The second is that potential players can be manipulated by the likely
winners of the game into believing that ‘they have everything a good player
should have’ or that ‘the game is much easier than it looks.’
That said, a player may sometimes want to enter a game even though he/she
knows that the odds are against him/her. This is the case when the costs of
losing are much lower than the beneﬁts of winning. It is, in fact, in the interest
of skilled players to reduce the costs of losing because this lowering of the
stakes (1) attracts less skilled players and (2) reduces their own risks in the
unlikely event that they should lose. Of course, minimizing the costs tends also
to lower the beneﬁts, all else being equal. This means that many games
probably evolve towards an optimum somewhere between the minimum cost
for losers and the maximum beneﬁt for winners.
There are many diﬀerent ways of minimizing the costs of losing. Generally,
most cultural mating games are highly ritualized ‘ﬁghts’ in which individuals
ﬁght each other with gifts (potlatch, e.g., Boone 1998), arguments (philosophy,
science), sounds (music), cards (bridge), and so on. If you lose these ritualized
fights, you only lose status or prestige.
One strategy for making a game attractive to ‘losers’ is to reduce the absolute
costs of losing, another is to reduce the relative costs of losing by augmenting
the (apparent or real) beneﬁts of participation itself. This strategy can be split
up into at least 10 different substrategies:
(1) Winners can exploit people’s tendency to conformism in order to convince
them that participating in a game is a precondition for social acceptance.
Evidently, this substrategy can be interpreted also as a means of reducing
the relative cost of losing – losing is bad for the individual’s reproductive
success, but ostracism is worse (O’Connor 2000; Richerson and Boyd
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increase cooperation to the maximum level in economic games (Ciny-
abuguma et al. 2005). For low status individuals, getting no attention at all
may be worse than getting negative attention. Zadro et al. (2005) show, for
example, that being the target of an argument (i.e., negative attention) is
less stressful than being the target of ostracism (i.e., no attention).
(2) People often imitate high status individuals under the notion that such
imitation raises one’s chances of acquiring the skills that lead to success,
even if the exact causes for the success of high status individuals are
oblique (Richerson and Boyd 2005). This prestige bias explains why many
individuals succumb to the temptation of participating in cultural games,
even though they have neither the skills nor the wherewithal necessary to
play the game successfully.
(3) Playing a cultural game usually helps one to develop, and possibly even
master, the skills necessary to win that game in the future. Participating in
a contest can sometimes be simply a form of training for future contests.
Although the adaptive role of play as a practice-for-the-future is less
straightforward than common intuition suggests (Bekoff and Byers 1981;
Spinka et al. 2001), recent evidence highlights the facilitating role of play
in the transmission of information (Virvou et al. 2005).
(4) The skills gained in a game can also be useful in other contests, so that
even if you can never win the game you are playing, it may still prove
beneficial to continue playing. Swimming, for example, makes your body
attractive, even if you lose every swimming contest you ever enter.
(5) Research into the dynamics of playing music has shown that playing tends
to strengthen bonds with other participants (Hagen and Bryant 2003).
This means that for some players losing is just the price they have to pay
for a valuable social network.
(6) Reciprocal altruism can result in a tacit contract: ‘I’ll play your game
if you’ll play mine.’ In other words, participating in games you are not
particularly good at may attract participants for the games you excell at.
(7) In some instances, the mere fact of being allowed to compete in a game is
itself a fitness indicator. Coming in last at the Olympic steeple chase is
better for your prestige than not having taken part in the race at all.
(8) Being a good loser may advertise certain psychological qualities (e.g.,
sportsmanship, equanimity, determination) that may be of interest to
potential mates or social allies in the public. While some female members
of the audience will no doubt aim to mate with the winner of the game
(‘cads’), other audience members will instead set their eyes on other po-
tential long-term mates (‘dads’) (Kruger et al. 2003).
(9) The willingness to lose can be a costly signal and thus beneficial (Zahavi
1975). For example, losing a lot of money at a casino may seem silly and
useless, but it is an honest signal of wealth.
(10) Entering a game is often an excellent means of evaluating the fitness of
others playing the same game.
480The last substrategy, which makes entering a contest almost identical to being
part of the game’s audience, raises the following question: why would one want
to be part of the audience? This might at ﬁrst sight seem obvious: watching
members of the other sex compete helps you make a good partner choice
because it allows you to evaluate the players’ ﬁtness. This means that it is in the
players’ interest to oﬀer the audience valid and easy-to-grasp clues of (herita-
ble) fitness (Trivers 1972). While that may indeed be the case when players and
audience are of different genders, from a Darwinian point of view it is less
obvious why some individuals love to watch a contest between individuals of
their own sex. That some men in the audience cheer other men on to victory
and excellence is almost a rebuttal of Darwinism, and yet, that is precisely what
happens all the time. There are certainly plenty of reasons why people love to
attend mating games such as concerts and tennis matches: identification with
the player, the aesthetic qualities of the performance, patriotism, and so forth.
The challenge for theories of cultural evolution is to frame these motives within
a Darwinian theory. Why would it be beneficial for one’s reproductive success
to attend a mating game?
(1) It is not only members of the opposite sex who have an interest in gaining
valuable information about the players’ fitness:
a. Since the outcome of the contest bears on the intrasexual hierarchy,
watching the game can also be beneficial for individuals of the players’ sex:
the outcome of a game tells you which player is the best ally, or worst
enemy, to have.
b. Some may use this information to steer the partner choice of their close kin
(e.g., children and siblings). This is especially relevant given the lack of
reproductive freedom in many human societies (Kasser and Sharma 1999).
(2) Attending a contest helps one gather information about technical aspects
of the contest, which in turn helps one to improve as a player. Indeed, in
many games, audience, and players share preferences, as, for instance, in
the political game (van Zoonen 2004).
(3) Mating games, because they are often social activities, are an excellent
occasion to form and strengthen affective bonds with other members of the
audience. And strong alliances with others are necessary to the acquisition
and maintenance of a high social rank (Cummins 2005).
Attending a cultural activity, in short, is not as ill-advised at it may seem at ﬁrst
sight. The costs of watching a game are often negligible, making even the
smallest beneﬁts attached to it suﬃce as an evolutionary explanation. However,
the costs seem to increase spectacularly once individuals start supporting one
of the players involved in the game. Since every player of one’s own sex is a
potential rival, the logical prediction would be for one to hate the winner, not
cheer him or her on.
One might challenge the claim that individuals of the same sex are each
other’s sexual rivals, since this seems to be true only for small-scale societies.
481In modern, large-scale societies the chances of meeting the top players and
competing with them are rather slim. David Beckham, Brad Pitt, and Bill
Clinton are not really our sexual rivals. However, as Aiello and Dunbar (1993)
have pointed out, the social EEA was a small-scale society. In other words, the
fact that Brad Pitt and other top players are not really our sexual rivals does
not mean that one does not perceive them as sexual rivals. Linda Mealey has
forwarded the hypothesis that anorexia is the result of a mismatch between (a)
women’s evolved tendency to compete for male attention and (b) the ‘unnat-
ural’ female models featured by today’s mass media that makes winning the
competition virtually impossible for most ‘ordinary’ women (Mealey 2000).
What Darwinian factors mitigate the rivalry?
1 Probably the same factors
that underpin the well-documented phenomenon that the success of a player or
team increases not only the status of this player or team, but also the status of
the supporters.
(4) If you already have an affective bond with one of the players, supporting
him is in your own interest, because his victory will only make him a better
ally. Moreover, supporting a player may signal loyalty to this player.
(5) Supporting close kin may enhance one’s inclusive fitness. Studies have
shown that sometimes cultural kin terms (‘my team is my family’) may be
used as a tool to manipulate adaptive tendencies to support biological kin
(Cronk 1999).
(6) Reciprocity can be a crucial factor, specially in small-scale societies: ‘I
support you when you play your game, you’ll support me when I play
mine.’ Probable loser’s participation in solo games (‘one-to-one games’)
might also be explained by a social network rationale if the loser’s oppo-
nents are part of his or her social network.
(7) Some mating games can signal both mate quality and coalition quality.
Music and dance, in Hagen and Bryant’s hypothesis (2003), serve these two
functions. This means that supporting one’s team sometimes permits
meaningful cooperative relationships between groups, since supporting the
team or player from your group signals to other groups that your group is
not plagued by internal conflicts. The benefits of such a coalition may
outweigh the costs of supporting an in-group rival, specially since in-group
rivalry is often very costly (Alexander 1987). Of course, this social network
rationale applies only to team games.
(8) Supporting a player of your own sex can make this player unreachable for
most members of the other sex, as most highly praised individuals usually
‘play in another league’ (or another niche) than those who praise him/her.
Moreover, men as well as women demand sexual exclusivity (Gangestad
and Simpson 2000), while very successful players are less likely to be
faithful (Townsend and Levy 1990).
1This riddle is to a large extent similar to the Darwinian paradox of excessive altruism in humans
(Fehr and Fischbacher 2003).
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commitment, perseverance, and several other important qualities (fitness
indicators) are tested and shown or evaluated. We expand upon this
characteristic in the next section.
Most of the listed factors have as their basis the idea that the players in
mating games send signals worth receiving/encoding. The quality and honesty
of signals determine not only the beneﬁts to both the players and the audi-
ence, they also determine the success of the game itself. It is reasonable to
expect that a game that is in some measure beneﬁcial to winners, losers, and
audience will be more stable (survive longer in the present form) than a game
with detrimental eﬀects to any one of the parties involved. The next section
discusses the factors that contribute to the stability, change, and innovation
of mating games.
The rise and fall of mating games
Cultural variation is important, as people with diﬀerent cultural backgrounds
behave diﬀerently in similar environments (Richerson and Boyd 2005). Not
only do they have different values, they also eat different things and play
different (mating) games (Roberts et al. 1959). Lacrosse, a ball game origi-
nally developed by Native Americans in the 15th century, is now quite
popular among college students in the USA and Canada, though only
marginally popular in the rest of the world; Sumo wrestling is largely con-
fined to Japan; only a few tribes in Afghanistan play the strange game of
Buzkashi; and many cultures have their own favourite board game. Al-
though, historically, most pre-modern sports were a form of religious wor-
ship, modern sports usually lack any reference to the transcendental
(Guttman 1978). In the arts, cultural, and historical diversity is even more
striking. People who claim to recognize another culture’s art as art often fail
to see the point or beauty of the work or performance (Darwin 1871; Maher
1976). And modern subcultures are good indicators that a variety of artistic
expressions and standards coexist within one culture. Over time, some of
these subcultures are assimilated into the mainstream, others go extinct, and
still others remain marginal.
The vast literature on the origins of inter- and intracultural diﬀerences leave
us in no doubt that geography, natural resources, individual creativity, and a
plethora of historical contingencies contribute to the generation of new cul-
tures in general and of new (mating) games in particular. Still, it is seems likely
that biological evolutionary forces interact with these factors to produce cul-
tural innovation, diversity, and stability. What, then, are these forces? And
how do they inﬂuence the evolution of mating games?
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game (a) if the perceived cost-beneﬁt ratio, taking into account the switch
costs,
2 of the ‘new’ game is better for the individual’s reproductive success than
the perceived cost-benefit ratio of the ‘old’ one, or (b) if the player believes he/
she can reap the cumulative benefits of simultaneously played mating games.
Because of the differences between our modern environment and the EAA, the
perceived cost-benefit ratio sometimes differs from the actual ratio, so that
modern individuals cannot always accurately assess the cost-benefit ratio of
their own reproductive success. In short, we should understand the evolu-
tionary costs and benefits as referring (a) to situations that on average had
negative (costs) or (b) positive (benefits) effects on the reproductive success of
our ancestors.
It goes without saying that an individual’s search for a new mating game
does not automatically result in some form of cultural innovation. Most
societies are not lacking for choice in mating games, which makes ‘game-
hopping’ between existing games always a possibility. Cultural innovation
needs pioneers, people who invent new games
3 that stand a chance of surviving
the starting phase because they are good enough games to attract both players
and audience. While the new game may initially give some information about
the players’ fitness, it is usually far from optimal in terms of measuring skills or
fitness: it produces an impure or ‘noisy’ hierarchy. Our mating game theory
suggests that if the game does not have the potential to optimize its informative
value, it will go extinct. This does not mean, however, that all the noise will
eventually be banned from the game; some noise may be required to attract
(less skilled) players (supra).
Reducing randomness (‘luck’) in a game is probably one of the best ways to
optimize its informative value. Almost every implicit and explicit rule of a
game is meant to reduce the luck-component. In other words, the evolution of
a game’s rules is directed at achieving as high a correlation as possible between
the ﬁtness of the players and their chances to win the game (Miller 2000). In
large-scale societies, there are numerous optimized games, many of which test
different fitness indicators more or less accurately. In Western societies, for
instance, one finds stand-up comedy, beauty contests, jazz, various athletic
disciplines, tennis, soccer, ballet, etc. But not all of these games are equally
successful if the game’s success is directly proportional to (a) the fitness-rele-
vancy of the game, and (b) the audience’s ability to decode the signals sent by
the players. In other words, the more informative, honest, and transparent a
game is, the higher its popularity will be. A game that tests accurately and
comprehensibly several mental (intelligence, perseverance, courage, ...) and
2A ‘fitness-valley’ may separate being an experienced player of game X and being a naive player of
game Y, even if an experienced player of game Y enjoys a better cost-benefit ratio than an
experienced player of game X. Switching from game X to game Y may require some sort of
‘surplus’ on the part of the player.
3www.guinnessworldrecords.com illustrates persuasively the human tendency to start ornamental
and competitive games.
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tunately, very transparent games are not always very informative ones, just as
very informative games are often difficult to understand. Many games, con-
sequently, have to find a balanced combination of informativeness and
transparency.
Players and audience are essential for a game to be successful, that is, for it to
survive as a game and for it to be ﬁtness-enhancing for players and audience.
But, beyond a minimal threshold, the game’s number of players and audience is
not perfectly correlated with its success as a mating game. In other words, games
can be very successful, even though they have only a relatively small audience.
After all, human mating strategies and human mating preferences are highly
conditional: some people maximize the number of sexual contacts (r-strategy),
and others restrict themselves only to one sexual partner with high fitness and
high parenting qualities (k-strategy) (Belsky et al. 1991; Gangestad and Simp-
son 2000). The latter will probably look for a highly informative mating game
with little transparency, though in this case the lack of transparency is an asset
because it raises the search costs, thus guaranteeing that the audience will
consist almost exclusively of VFPs (Very Fit People). Differently put, games
need not always compete with each other, provided, that is, that they are played
in different (sub-)niches, by different players, and for different audiences.
We can further illustrate this point with a short and tentative sketch of the
diﬀerences between ‘male’ and ‘female’ games. Although we have noted above
that in humans both sexes are choosy, the existence of important cross-sex
diﬀerences both in the choosiness and in the criteria of choice have to be
acknowledged. These sex-diﬀerences are probably reﬂected in game-playing
behaviour. Trivers (1972) has already suggested that because in our species the
male sex invests less in offspring, males will compete more vigorously for access
to strongly investing women. Hence, if cultural activities are mating games, one
can expect male cultural activities to be more competitive than games primarily
played by women. Moreover, the qualities sought by one sex are most likely the
qualities advertised in the games played by the other sex. Cross-cultural re-
search has indicated that men value physical attractiveness (a cue for health) in
potential partners more than women do. Conversely, female preference for
kind and understanding males (a cue for willingness to invest in offspring)
exceeds the male preference for potential partners with these traits (Buss and
Schmitt 1993). The upshot is that men will be proportionally more engaged in
the writing of poetry, while women will rather spend their time, energy and
resources on beauty contests. Women will read more poetry than men do, while
the audience of beauty contests will be primarily male. This also means that
poetry and beauty contests do not have to compete with each other.
Still, there are two reasons why competition between games is ubiquitous.
The ﬁrst is that some games are played in the same, or a highly similar, niche.
The second is that potential players have only a limited time to engage in all
possible games. Such competition between games can sometimes be determined
by factors related to the above-mentioned optimal balance. Constraints on
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ways of rendering a mating game relatively immune to competition, thus sta-
bilizing it as a successful mating game. We can categorize these ways under two
headings: panem and circenses (the Roman ‘bread and circuses’). The circenses
category of mating games acquired stabilization because of its entertainment
value; the panem because of its useful byproducts.
a. Circenses
Meta-mating games depend on other mating games. Being the best (smartest,
most dedicated, prettiest, funniest) supporter (fan, art critic, Maecenas,
gambler) only makes sense if there are players for you to support. Your
support for the players, because it is inevitably also a support for the game, is a
factor which increases the viability of the game. Hence, the symbiosis of mating
games and meta-mating games: their association is advantageous both to
players and audience.
Meta-mating games originate in the game’s audience. For the mating game to
survive, the meta-mating game has to attract new players as well as a new
audience. The players and the audience of the meta-mating game may differ
substantially from the original game’s players and audience, since the meta-
mating game usually tests other fitness indicators and provides different
information. Moreover, the meta-mating game may in the long run alter the
original mating game, for instance by generating money for the players of the
original mating game. This of course adds an economic surplus value to the
benefits already attached to excelling in the original mating, and may even
change a player’s motive for participating in the game in the first place. Players
of the original mating game can now attract, because of the money, members of
the other sex who are less interested in the qualities of an excellent player of the
original game, but who are very interested in signals of material wealth. Losing
becomes less dramatic because participating provides new benefits. This process
manages to solve one of the threats to the viability of the original mating game,
namely finding players who lack the skill and wherewithal to win.
The meta-mating game can render the original game immune to competition
from other games, but only to a certain extent. Since meta-mating games
compete with one another, the defeat of a meta-mating game can also bring
down the game it is built on.
Popular sports and their audiences are obvious examples of circenses. Both
social realms, the game and the meta-game, bear the characteristics of mating
games, and the extent to which a sport can turn into a business seems tightly
correlated to its audience size. That said, nothing prevents a game from
eventually fading away as better games appear on the scene.
b. Panem
Economic surplus value is also attainable without the help of meta-mating
games. The surplus value – the direct, though not necessarily intentional,
486side-effect of the mating game – can after a while become the main motive for
participating in the game. When this happens, the mating game has been
transformed into a collective survival strategy. This exaptation will then
determine the further evolution or development of the cultural activity. In one
scenario, the mating game may keep some of its original functions after the
transition to panem, although the quality that it signals may change. Mating
games that follow this path are likely to become part of the educational system,
and excelling at them may therefore also start signaling conformism, zeal,
persistence, and so on.
A possible example of panem is architecture. Although it may have developed
as a costly signal to advertise one’s fitness (Neiman 1997), once it was seen to
be useful for sheltering the members of the architect’s community, the
architectural survival strategy exapted the architectural mating game. And it
was through this partial ‘exaptation’ (architecture still functions as a costly
signal), the cultural activity of architecture guaranteed its own survival.
Discussion and conclusion
Culture is a very ‘complex whole’ (Cronk 1999) in that nearly every cultural
activity combines survival value with status value. We have tried in this paper
to contribute to our understanding of human cultural practices, their huge
variety and dynamism, by refining and elaborating upon the concept of mating
game. Our contribution offers a way of linking Darwinian processes in cultural
evolution theories with first order (biological) Darwinian processes. In the
body of the paper we proposed a number of fitness-enhancing factors to ex-
plain why people invent new games, play existing games, enter games they are
bound to lose, or watch and support others play. An important question must
now be raised: how might this theory stimulate further conceptual and
empirical work? One such way is by proposing general empirical strategies
based on our theory, and another is by looking at the areas for future research
that may be inspired by the current work.
By achieving this double task, our theory goes beyond a cheap ‘just-so-story’
(Brandon 1990) because, first of all, it is firmly grounded in Darwinian theory,
recent theorizing included; secondly, because it dovetails common intuition
and empirical evidence; and thirdly, because it provides a broad explanation
for that wide range of phenomena that we call ‘culture.’ But exactly how widely
does our theory apply? The strong version of our theory claims that all cultural
activities are, or once were, mating games; the weak version claims that all
cultural practices with a competitive and ornamental aspect are mating games.
The weak version allows for the view that some cultural practices, particularly
those with a competitive and ornamental aspect, originated as survival strat-
egies but turned into mating games only later on, while other cultural practices
never did turn into mating games and thus remain outside the mating game
487subset altogether. Hunting technology, for example, seems to support only the
weak version of our theory: it has clear survival benefits and therefore it may
have originated in the need for game rather than in the need to signal qualities.
However, such practices can be used simultaneously to enhance one’s status
(Mithen 2003). Hunting is a means of getting food, yes, but it is probably also,
and frequently at that, a way for males to show-off (Hawkes and Bliege Bird
2002). The strong version of our theory implies that hunting indeed originated
as play and was subsequently exapted as a highly useful means of ensuring
calory intake. Farming is a similar example. While at first sight farming seems
clearly to have originated as a response to climatic conditions (Fagan 2004),
the strong version of our model suggests rather that farming, science, and
indeed all economic activities originated as mating games. An important
implication of our theory is that the ornamental phase may in fact be essential
to human economic development, as a way of bridging the gap between the
emergence of an essentially useless activity and the moment when that activity
actually becomes useful. Put it this way: the first attempts to tame sheep may
have been a sign of insight into animal psychology, an important precondition
for successful hunting, and not a conscious attempt to cultivate livestock on the
part of people who could afford not to eat all the meat at their disposal.
The strong version of the mating game theory is admittedly speculative and
counterintuitive. However, the strong version outruns the weak version as a
heuristic device because it leads to various testable predictions and hypotheses.
We will conclude this paper with a preliminary sketch of these hypotheses, the
ﬁrst set of which deals with the origin of cultural practices.
Archeological research will ﬁnd our model useful when looking at signs of
competition in cultural practices normally thought to be straightforward eco-
nomic activities. There is evidence that dogs were domesticated before cattle
(Fagan 2004), and we predict that flowers were cultivated before wheat.
Farming, that is, originated as play and was exapted in times of environmental
stress (Fagan 2004). Archeology may also find evidence of very low economic
surplus of certain artifacts or objects that have been considered as weapons or
tools. Maybe stones and hand axes were originally used as play objects rather
than as weapons or cutting devices.
Our model is useful to the ﬁeld of economics, where it might shed new light
on organization structure and income inequality. Trotsky was probably wrong
when he said that competitive sports could be used to keep competitive ‘in-
stincts’ out of the economy (Collier 1998). These ‘competitive instincts,’ far
from being domain-specific, tend instead to contaminate every human activity.
In other words, organizations may benefit from allowing the emergence of
many parallel mating games in the workplace, mating games in which the
winners of the job-related games may be the losers of unrelated ones. Such
reciprocity enhances stability and increases loyalty on the part of the
employees. Further, our model predicts that in panem there is a perennial
tension between the original aim (signaling the quality of the game) and the
exapted economic activity (obtaining resources, creating something socially
488useful). In scientific research, for instance, basic research is closer to the aims of
the original mating game because one of its defining characteristics is that it is
not directly useful for society (that is, it is ornamental). This leads to the
prediction that basic scientific researchers will have greater prestige but lower
incomes than their colleagues, applied researchers. For circenses, the opposite
relation should hold: higher status should be directly related to income, since
those with the best skills attract the largest audience, which in turn generates
higher revenues. Lastly, we suggest that our model is useful to psychology,
because it allows psychologists to make verifiable predictions concerning the
more proximate mediators of cultural evolution. Androgen and serotonin
levels, for instance, may regulate the search for new mating games, while
hormone levels are themselves the result of complex gene–environment inter-
actions. Manning’s finding that men with a low 2D:4D strive more adamantly
for status than men with a high 2D:4D (Manning 2002) allows for the pre-
diction that highly skilled people will be more likely to participate in mature
mating games, whereas people with low skills will be more inclined to play
games that are not yet mature. We predict, further, that this difference will be
larger for low 2D:4D men than for high 2D:4D men. And if we refine our pool
still further and control only for intelligence or artistic skill, we predict that low
2D:4D people will prefer to engage in fundamental scientific research or elite
culture (because of the prestige), whereas high 2D:4D people will prefer applied
scientific research or mass culture (because of the economic surplus).
To conclude, we suggest that our model, which ties cultural to biological
evolution, provides a necessary building block in our eﬀorts to achieve a grand
and unifying Darwinian cultural theory. While we realize that many gaps still
need to be ﬁlled, we believe the model is speciﬁc enough to allow testable
predictions in a range of disciplines.
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